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An Economie Critique 
of Current Technological 
Change Displacement Techniques 
David Phillips Ross 
This study attempts to assess how effective are the 
présent methods employed by private parties for adjusting 
workers to technological change ; and effective is defined on 
the basis of the loss that displaced workers are expected to 
incur. The major conclusion is that if provisions such as 
advance notice, ?everance pay, attrition, seniority and 
bumping, early retirement, reduced work week, joint corn-
mittees, and retraining are performing effectively it is 
largely the resuit of luck and circumstance. 
Technological change may often create économie and, consequently, 
social problems because of the permanent and frequently abnipt and 
massive dislocations it causes in labour markets. Unassisted compétitive 
labour markets can generally be expected to adjust to such dislocations, 
but it takes time for the various priées to signal the required changes, 
and where necessary for complementary factors to appear. However, the 
économie and social problems naturally coincide with this adjustment 
period as many workers become unemployed and/or seriously downgraded. 
Recognising this problem, the private sector has responded with certain 
procédures for assisting those workers displaced by technological change, 
and governments hâve also been called upon to provide assistance. The 
présent paper attempts to assess how well the private sector provisions 
actually assist the workers who are displaced. 
When assessing the différent 
provisions, emphasis is placed on 
how effective the provisions are in 
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assisting those workers who suffer the greatest losses and, hence, pose 
the greatest economic and social problems *. Emphasis is not given to 
indiscriminate and generous offers of assistance paid without regard to 
the displaced worker's losses. If private assistance provides aid primarily 
to those who are little harmed by displacement, and gives little or nothing 
to those who are greatly harmed, then the economic and social problems 
associated with technological change will persist. 
Our contention is that only half the job is completed when we simply 
take a numerical count of technological change provisions in private 
sector agreements and then try to evaluate that sector's ability to handle 
the problems created by technological change. What is also necessary is 
to evaluate the quality of those provisions with respect to assisting 
seriously harmed workers. 
Many of the spécifie assistance provisions hâve been studied else-
where on a piecemeal basis ; but it is time for ail of the information to 
be brought together so that we can begin to assess the private sector's 
overall performance in the technological change assistance area. Upon 
having completed this assessment if it then appears that the private 
sector provisions hâve serious shorteomings, then perhaps there is a need 
to re-think and change them, or to introduce public législation; and if 
there is change or public législation then perhaps this présent type of 
qualitative assessment may be of use in formulating better and more 
comprehensive private or public assistance policies. 
After first setting out a brief définition of technological change 
in the following section, the remainder of the paper will turn to an 
assessment of the différent private sector provisions. 
Définition of Technological Change 
Probably the most familiar and commonly accepted définition of 
technological change would describe it as a qualitative change in the factors 
1
 The author has more fully developed and defined a notion of effective 
provisions elsewhere ; see, David Philips Ross, « The Economies of Privately 
Negotiated Technological Change Provisions », I.R.R.A. Proceedings, 1967, p. 375. 
The author would like to acknowledge the helpful discussions and comments 
of : Professor Alton CRAIG, University of Ottawa ; and George SAUNDERS and Félix 
QUINET of the Fédéral Government of Canada. Many of the ideas expressed in 
this paper were conceived while the author spent the summer of 1969 associated 
with the Fédéral Department of Labour in Ottawa, but the Department or the 
above named are in no way implicated with the results. 
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of production, or simply a qualitative change in the production fonction. 
This is illustrated in familiar two dimensional graphie analysis as a shift 
in the iso-quant surface towards the origin. 2 When this type of change 
occurs there generally is a réduction in demand for some, and occasionally 
for ail of the previously employed factors of production. Examples of this 
type of change hâve occurred in the longshoring, and publishing industries. 
A broader définition of technological change would encompass the 
above type of change but would also allow for large and rather sudden 
changes in consumer tastes that resuit in shifts in demand for the final 
output of various firms or industries. This type of change leads to a 
réduction in demand for ail types of previously employed factors of pro-
duction. Examples of this type of change hâve occurred in the coal mining, 
and blacksmithing industries. 
It is not important when assessing the effects of assistance provisions 
which définition of technological change is adopted. A casual sarvey of 
collective agreements will reveal références to both types ; although the 
production function type of change is probably more frequently referred 
to. It is important, however, to distinguish between technological changes 
according to whether or not firms are forced from an industry. Firms may 
be forced from an industry because either the market is shrinking (demand 
shift), or because new techniques of production, that expand scale, require 
fewer firms in the market (production function change). 
This latter distinction is truly important when evaluating some of 
the assistance provisions. For example, it certainly affects the usefulness 
of an attrition, in-plant training, or seniority and bumping clause whether 
or not the firm shuts down. On the other hand, for a provision like advance 
notice, post-change survival or shut-down makes virtually no différence 
to the notice's effectiveness. 
In the sections that foliow, the reader can assume either the broad 
or narrow définition of technological change ; but, whenever the death 
of a firm affects our assessment of provisions effectiveness this will be 
specifically emphasized. 
Current Assistance Provisions 
This section contains brief criticisms of some of the popular assistance 
2
 For example see, C. E. FERGUSON, Microeconomic Theory, Rev. éd. Hoine-
wood, Richard D. IRWIN, 1969, p. 386. 
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techniques currently being employed by the private sector.3 However, 
as alluded to in the introduction it would be quite possible for govern-
ments to legislate many of thèse provisions as minimum standards if the 
private sector were incapable of handling the adjustment problem. 
ADVANCE NOTICE 
If advance notice were costless to firms, the one might almost expect 
them to provide notice on a voluntary basis. However, through advance 
notice a firm may incur costs such as : prématuré quitting, which means 
the subséquent necessity of hiring temporary workers ; a décline in morale 
resulting in decreased productivity, perhaps even sabotage ; and, rival 
firms may gain important foreknowledge of future plans. 
On the positive side, advance notice may provide two benefits. First, 
it allows the workers time to make personal préparations may involve 
employment while still being employed. Thèse préparations may involve 
either searching for work and/or participating in retraining. Second, 
advance notice gives other bodies a chance to set their programs or pro-
cédures in action : in Canada, this may involve the manpower Depart-
ment's job placement, retraining, or relocation programs ; or, within a 
company, it may involve a joint committee, or the establishment of a 
private retraining program. Regardless of the préparations chosen, advance 
notice should provide a certain benefit by reducing the incidence of un-
employment and downgrading at the time the actual displacement occurs. 
Unfortunately, the value to the worker of advance notice has never 
been well documented, and the potential benefits referred to above may 
in fact never materialize. One of advance notice's possible shortcomings 
is that workers may simply not believe the notice, and this is especially 
so when the notice does not single out the individual workers to be dis-
placed or dismissed. However, even when the entire plant is to shut-down, 
leading to the displacement of ail workers, many may still disbelieve an 
advance notice. A study of a planned steel mill shut-down in Sydney, 
Nova Scotia found that 38 percent of the work force did not believe the 
plant would close even after an announcement to this effect had been 
3
 The frequency of which various provisions appear in collective agreements 
has been the subject of three separate Canadian surveys, the first of which was 
carried out by the présent writer. Canada, Department of Labour, Response to 
Technological Change, 1967 ; Ontario Department of Labour, Technological 
Change Provisions in Ontario Collective Agreements, 1967 ; and, Nova Scotia, 
Department of Labour, Technological Change Provisions in the Manufacturing 
Industry in Nova Scotia, no date. 
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made. 4 Another study on the closing of a steelwares plant in Toronto also 
refers to the gênerai atmosphère of disbelief prevailing at the time of 
the announced shut-down.5 
Even assuming that workers believe advance notices, there are diffi-
culties that must be recognised and overcome in order to make advance 
notices effective, and références will be made below to « non-notices » ; 
that is notices which are planned to be ineffective but nonetheless may 
fulfil the letter of an advance notice agreement provision. 
The reason that advance notice difficulties are given extra treatment 
in our discussion is that this type of provision is fast becoming a popular 
minimum standard for législation by public bodies. For example, in 
Canada, the Province of Québec has legislated advance notice, the Pro-
vince of Ontario is enacting this type of législation, and it is strongly 
expected that the Fédéral Government will include an advance notice 
provision in its labour législation program likely to be introduced into 
the House sometime in 1971. Therefore, it is particularly important to 
look at the peculiar difficulties that can, if mis-managed, make an advance 
notice provision little more than gratuitous législation for public con-
sumption. Of course thèse difficulties must also be solved by labour and 
management in their own private contracts as well ; but we are emphasizing 
legislated advance notice because current governmental concern with it 
makes advance notice more of a public than a private topic in Canada. 
The difficulties associated with advance notice are closely related, 
but for the purposes of study can be grouped under three separate head-
ings : the length of advance notice, the wording of the notice, and who 
is to be notified. Thèse difficulties are discussed in turn. 
(i) The optimum length of advance notice requires a balancing of 
the aforementioned costs and benefits. Since advance notice levies costs 
on the company in proportion to the length of the notice, as the resuit of 
prématuré quits and decreased productivity, it is hypothesized that manage-
ments opposition to advance notice will increase with the proposed length 
of advance notice ; and consequently its co-operation in implementing 
advance notice will vary inversely with the length. We will emphasize 
4 CAMPBELL, Douglas and NICHOLSON, John, « The Sydney Steelworkers' 
Adjustments to Economie Insecurity », a paper read at the Third Annual Meeting 
of the Canadian Atlantic Provinces' Sociologists and Anthropologists, 1969 (mi-
meographed). 
5 BOASE, R. G., Study of the Closing of a Surplus Plant, Toronto, United 
Steelworkers of America, 1966. 
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below, in connection with particular wording, that it is vital to the success 
of a notice that managements coopération be cultivated. 
Recognizing then that there are almost certainly some costs to length-
ening the advance notice, one should attempt to measure the increased 
costs against the increased benefits to be gained. As we hâve stated, the 
purpose of an advance notice is : first, to allow workers to search for 
alternative employment ; and second, to allow public and private man-
power officiais time to prépare their programs. The question therefore is : 
how much of a gain in benefits can workers and officiais achieve with six 
months' notice as opposed to say three months' notice ? In fact it is quite 
likely that there is some length at which the benefits of a further length-
ening would be zéro ; but, yet the burden of uncertainty for the worker 
would be increased so that on balance ail that we may achieve is a length-
ening of the period through which workers will fruitlessly worry. 
Our survey shows that over 75 percent of the private agreements 
containing an advance notice provision stipulate lengths of three months 
or less ; hense this may be some kind of indication of the mutually desire-
able length, or perhaps the length beyond which management may become 
quite unco-operative. 6 
In Canada, the récent Prime Minister's Task Force on Labour Rela-
tions recommended six months' notice but it gave no basis for this figure. 7 
Six months seems to be a popular round figure but nowhere hâve I seen 
its dérivation based on any rational cost-benefit approach such as I hâve 
suggested. Our survey shows less than 12 percent of the agreements con-
taining advance notice stipulating six months' notice or greater, and only 
six percent stipulating six months' notice in itself. 8 
Without first examining the benefits or advantages of advance notice 
there appears to be no rational foundation for a six month figure. Further-
more, the benefits are going to vary according to the size of the displace-
ment, whether the change is in a rural or urban setting, and on the public 
assistance programs available in that area. It is encouraging to note that 
the Québec and Ontario type of législation at least recognizes the need 
for variable lengths of notice according to size of displacement, and 
whether it occurs in a rural or urban setting. 
6 Response to Technological Change, op. cit., appendix, Table 2. 
7 Canadian Industrial Relations — The Report of the Task Force on Labour 
Relations, Ottawa, The Queen's Printer, 1969, 195. 
8
 Response to Technological Change, op. cit., appendix, Table 2. 
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(ii) The second difficulty associated with advance notice evolves 
from the spécifie wording or form of any particular notice. Almost 
certainly, the spécifie wording of a notice provision and the length of 
the notice are inversely related and hâve to be traded off so that the 
longer the notice, the less spécifie it will be. In one case study it 
has been suggested that the wording of the first advance notice was so 
non-commital that the workers virtually ignored it9 . Hence, one has to 
be aware of what I would call the « non-notice ». 
What kind of spécifies are we talking about ? Let us take two 
hypothetical, but représentative notices. 10 In the first case the company 
states that it : is « reviewing » its organizational policies and that « some 
changes » may be made in the « near future », but that the company is 
« intending » to transfer « some » of its opérations to another city and 
that it is also « seriously considering » opening another opération in 
the présent city so that consequently « some » workers may « possibly » 
be accommodated there. Contrast this notice then with one such as the 
following : in six months the company is discontinuing its production of 
zinc grommets only, and fifty positions will be eliminated; however, 
the firm is opening a new line in a plant to be located in the same city, 
and will require the services of thirty men there. 
Certainly, no person can expect either workers or manpower 
authorities to act on the first type of notice ; but yet the company can 
clearly claim that it did give advance notice. Furthermore, we will 
never know whether in fact the company did act in good faith and truly 
did not know its plans in any détail at the time it issued its « non-notice ». 
It will be difficult to incorporate in any agreement or législation the 
spécifie conditions that must be spelled out in an advance at any given 
time prior to the change. 
9 BOASE, op. cit., p. 11. 
10
 In case the reader thinks that advance notice clauses in collective agreements 
tend to rigorously specify the format of any particular notice, the following clauses 
located in a quick reading of advance notice provisions are provided as contrary 
évidence ; furthermore, thèse clauses are not atypical. 
When it is « anticipated » that there will be.. (change), the company will 
inform the employée or employées concerned and the syndicate at least six months 
before such layoff will take place, « whenever possible ». 
OR: 
The employer shall hâve the right to modifly production or introduce mechani-
zation changes or equipment. As « soon as feasible » after any such décision is 
made, the employer shall notify the union officiai, (emphasis added). 
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((iii) Tied in closely with the wording of an advance notice and its 
length, is the third difficulty of to whom is advance notice given : the 
union, the work force in gênerai, or the spécifie workers that are to be 
displaced ? Hère again we run into a trade-off problem : generally, the 
longer the advance notice, the less certain the company can be about the 
spécifie workers to be displaced. It is probably expecting too much to 
assume that the company even knows ail the spécifie positions that are 
going to be affected by any change, but in the event that it does, 
positions and men are not the same thing. When there are other assistance 
provisions in the agreement, even relatively weak but wide-spread ones 
such as seniority and transfer, the company is absolutely at a loss to 
détermine in advance which workers will ultimately be displaced. This 
problem is particularly acute in multi-plant firms where multi-plant 
transfer plans exist. For example, the company cannot foresee that a 
position designated redundant in say the Montréal plant will lead to the 
incumbent transferring to the Toronto plant and bumping a worker there 
for a position that was not designated redundant. While this type of 
inter-plant bumping may not be fréquent, intra-plant bumping which is 
more fréquent présents the same difficulties. 
A related type of problem which makes it difficult to specify in 
advance the workers who are to be displaced occurs when a firm wishes 
to relocate a limited number of workers to job openings at other plants 
and is willing to bear ail expenses in moving the men. The company 
begins by estimating that to fill the new jobs it can, for example, offer 
positions to ail workers with 15 years' seniority, but naturally not ail 
will choose to transfer ; therefore, in a second round the company offers 
the remaining unfilled openings to ail those with ten years' seniority, and 
again some will accept and some will reject the opportunity. This process 
is then repeated until either ail openings are filled or ail workers hâve 
been given the opportunity to transfer. The company will always find it 
impossible under thèse conditions to détermine which workers are re-
dundant until ail transferred positions hâve been filled, and this can be a 
length process. Of course it can be said that spécifie workers hâve a 
fairly good knowledge of whether the company is going to offer them a 
position or not, but nonetheless a good deal of uncertainty is going to 
be présent and especially when the work-force is large, so that consequently 
it is virtually impossible in advance to specify which workers will be 
displaced. 
Thèse, then, are some of the difficulties that hâve to be overcome 
when one considers the effectiveness of an advance notice provision. It 
will be extremely difficult far in advance to flatly require that in ail 
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instances the company must precisely specify the change, and that it must 
also notify the spécifie workers. But nonetheless what should be clearly 
understood is that there is a trading-off problem, and that if we want 
greater clarity in ail of the spécifies of an advance notice then we almost 
certainly hâve to reduce the length of the notice. One cannot randomly 
choose a length and then expect the wording and other contents of the 
notice to always follow some clear and automatically précise content format. 
Perhaps recognising this, a séries of notices would be appropriate, so that 
as the length gets shorter the spécifies are more sharply defined. 
SEVERANCE PAY 
Our 1967 survey concluded that almost ail (88%) of the severance 
pay provisions are based on length of service ; and this being the case 
it is not certain, nor likely, that assistance is being given in an effective 
manner 11 
In many cases there is no connection between âge or service and 
displacement losses. This follows because most in-plant training is granted 
and acquired on a seniority basis so that the older worker, when displaced, 
possesses the most marketable of skills and the young highschool drop-out 
two years on his first job possesses no skills. Furthermore, it is small 
consolation to the drop-out to be told that if he had stayed in school he 
would not be in such a predicament today. 
In circumstances such as thèse, would it not make more sensé to give 
a larger proportion of any sum designated for severance pay to the young 
drop-out so that he can acquire some training, and a smaller proportion to 
the already skilled worker who secures work at the same wage the day 
following his displacement ? This is not to deny that in other cases, 
especially where emphasis is primarily on physical rather than cérébral 
skills, âge and seniority may be a good proxy for expected loss and, 
therefore, an application of the usual severance pay - to - service 
criterion could be an effective means for granting assistance. 
Furthermore, we are not suggesting that it is necessarily improper 
to reward severed senior workers. However, I suggest that it is improper 
to do this under the guise of a displacement assistance provision ; and it 
is important to recall that ail of the severance provisions siurveyed 
referred explicity to the problem of adjusting to technological change. 
The indiscriminate granting of displacement assistance tends to blur the 
fact that the burden of technological change in not automatically borne 
n Response to Technological Change, op cit., appendix, Table 2. 
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by the oldest, but rather by those that lack éducation and training ; 
and, unless assistance tends to be scaled to the amount that workers 
suffer, the economic and conséquent social problems associated with 
displacement will persist under this type of private management. Under 
the bulk of the agreements surveyed, severance pay today will effectively 
solve thèse problems only if seniority and loss are highly correlated. But 
why should we rely on this chance corrélation occuring ? It would seem 
much more logical in those cases where severance pay is granted for 
assisting displaced workers that it be given in amounts proportionate to 
the actual loss that will be incurred. And in a later section we will 
see now a joint committee may be a useful vehicle for assessing thèse 
actual losses. 
In other instances where it is desired to reward senior workers 
purely for lengthy and loyal service, or for property rights that they 
hâve allegedly built up in the company, a provision can be inserted for 
this purpose 12. 
A second and closely related shortcoming of private severance 
provisions is that they are even more frequently scalled to income (96%) 
that they are to length of service 13. Again, viewing this criterion from 
the standpoint of effectively providing assistance to workers displaced 
by technological change, I see no reason why expected loss will system-
atically be positively related to income. In fact, this criterion seems 
somewhat less defensible that the length of service criterion, since in 
many cases while one would expect âge and expected loss to be positively 
correlated, one would expect that with few exceptions the reverse would 
hold for the relationship between présent income and expected loss. 
The normal expectation would be for vice-présidents and professionals 
to be infrequently harmed by technological change because of their 
broader knowledge and adaptability. 
ATTRITION 
This method of assisting workers will create the least amount of 
featherbedding and cost to the company, and hence be a useful and 
!2 The idea of there being an equity or a property right to severance pay has 
been discussed by Simon ROTTENBERG, « Property in Work », lndustrial and Labor 
Relations Review, Ithaca, Vol. 15, April, 1962, 402. See also the interesting article 
by Vladimir STOIKOV, who attempts to construct an economic rationale for severance 
pay, « The Allocation of the Cost of Displaced Labor and Severance Pay », The 
Journal of Human Resources, Madison, Vol. IV, Spring, 1969, 192. 
13
 Response to Technological Change, op. cit., appendix, Table 2. 
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acceptable adjustment technique when : the work force has a high 
turnover ; the change is planned by the company well in advance of the 
actual introduction of the new method ; and the skills and workers in 
the plant are fairly homogeneous. We will deal with thèse in turn. 
Natural turnover may be high if a large percentage of the work 
force is made up of women or older workers. However, attrition can be 
artificially increased by providing severance payments or early retirement 
benefits to older workers. 
If the company has planned the technological change some time in 
advance, then it can « store-up » turnover. It can do this by hiring only 
temporary workers prior to the actual displacement and by encouraging 
those eligible to retire to stay on a while longer so that when the 
displacement occurs, permanent workers, who otherwise would be dis-
missed, move into the positions formerly held by the temporary workers. 
This method of « turn-over storage » has been successfully used by a 
Canadian publishing firm 14. However, one wonders what happens to the 
temporary workers (normal retirées excepted) ; perhaps to a great extent 
the cost of technological change is merely being shifted from one group 
of workers to another. It might be an interesting study in itself to examine 
the income profiles of temporary workers. 
Finally, only if company job openings require skills that are similar 
to those possessed by the redundant workers will we expect attrition 
to be a useful adjustment technique. If skills are dis-similar (non-
homogeneous), then we get into the problem of retraining, and this 
raises another distinct assistance technique that we will discuss below. 
The value of attrition for adjusting to technological change will generally 
increase with an increase in the number of planned displacements relative 
to the firm's total employment. Finally, in the case of a plant shut-down 
attrition will be of no value whatsoever in assisting workers. 
SENIORITY AND BUMPING 
If one believes that seniority should be a criterion for rétention 
of workers, perhaps on the basis that older workers are the most seriously 
affected by technological change, then a broad or plant-wide seniority 
14
 Pacific Press Limited, Vancouver. This change involved approximately 
seventy workers, and the total work force numbered in excess of one thousand. See 
G. K. COWAN, Proposed Measures to Facilitate Manpower Adjustment to Techno-
logy and Other Change : Twelve Selected Case Studies, a study prepared for the 
Economie Council of Canada, 1966, p. 47. 
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rule should be developed 15. This will be especially so when technological 
change is of the production function type, because often entire departments 
or trades are automated out while others remain untouched. This type 
of technological change does not always eut evenly through ail departments 
or trades, and consequently very senior employées are displaced in some 
departments although very junior employées are retained in others when 
a narrow seniority rule is in effect. The classic example of this situation 
involved that of the fireman on the railroads when dieselization took place. 
Given a plant or company-wide seniority rule to protect the senior 
and aged, it follows that technological change will affect the younger 
people in disproportionately greater numbers ; and this resuit may hâve 
very serious shorteomings. By using this technique, the costs of tech-
nological change are merely shifted from one class of workers to another 
and there is no guarantee that the one group (the younger) will suffer 
less loss by being displaced than the other group (the older) since, as 
we argued in the severance pay section, there is no a priori belief that 
expected loss and âge are strongly, or even positively correlated. Therefore, 
seniority provisions do not automatically protect those workers who will 
incur the largest losses through displacement. Furthermore, consider what 
happens if we combine seniority-bumping with severance payments when 
both are geared to seniority. The younger workers are now doubly 
disadvantaged since they receive protection from neither provision. 
A final observation on narrow seniority units concerns the extent 
to which they can frustrate attempts to hâve workers transferred either 
within a plant or between plants when thèse transfers are essential for 
the success of attribution and retraining provisions. According to case 
studies, the potential effectiveness of transferring workers has been 
seriously reduced when a worker has had to enter another seniority unit 
since disagreement has occurred over the extent to which the transférée 
retained his former seniority rights with respect to promotion and lay-off16. 
The most acceptable solution seems to hâve been that of placing transferred 
workers at the bottom of the seniority list in their new unit but to allow 
them to retain their service rights on such matters as vacations, pensions, 
and sick-pay. 
15 A broadened seniority provision to be activated only during a technological 
change was found in 16% of the agreements containing change provisions ; see, 
Technological Change Provisions in Ontario, op. cit., p. 52. 
16
 Arthur KRUGER, Human Adjustment to lndustrial Conversion, p. 67 : a study 
prepared for the Prime Minister's Task Force on Labour Relations, op. cit. See also, 
COWAN, op. cit., p. 37. 
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Yet it is obvious that this solution is not designed to increase 
the mobility among workers that is so often required to make a firm's 
assistance policy successful. It is generally the transferred workers who 
are in direct need of security, since they are giving up ail in their 
home community and casting their future in a foreign one. Generally, it 
will be much harder for them to endure lay-offs from their new positions 
than it will be for those workers already settled in the community. In 
conclusion, there is much to recommend the adoption of the broadest 
possible seniorîty unit when dealing with technological change. 
EARLY RETIREMENT 
Compulsory early retirement is basically a procédure for shifting 
the cost of technological change from younger to older workers ; and this 
is more so, the greater the différence is between présent earnings and 
the proposed pension income. Conceptually, early retirement provisions 
differ little from severance provisions except that in the former it is 
the older workers who are systematically severed. From a purely économie 
cost-benefit standpoint one can justify early retirement provisions on 
the basis that the older worker has fewer working years ahead of him 
than the younger worker and therefore his expected losses through job 
discontinuation are smaller. Consequently, if we are granting assistance 
according to expected losses, the amount of assistance fortheoming will 
usually be less when the older workers' rather than the younger workers' 
jobs are discontinued. 
On the other hand, if the early retirement pension is made attractive 
enough it is possible to stimulate a program of voluntary early retirement. 
This kind of provision is hard to fault on grounds of equity since it is 
apparent that for workers to volunteer, the compensation (pension) has 
obviously been made similar in total to the costs that will be incurred 
by the worker through his displacement. 
REDUCED WORK WEEK 
This type of provision, sometimes referred to as « employment 
sharing » could also be aptly renamed « unemployment sharing ». The 
major shorteoming of this approach is that either ail workers must 
directly suffer through a permanently reduced income as the resuit of 
working shorter hours ; or else, by working shorter hours and maintaining 
the same take-home pay, and hence shifting the cost fully to the company, 
the reduced hours will almost certainly resuit in a long-run substitution 
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of capital for labour and simply aggravate the initial unemployment 
problem 17. 
The first approach, that of taking reduced income for greater leisure, 
is a positive solution only if the workers at this particular moment 
voluntary désire this trade-off. If they do not, then we hâve simply 
spread the cost of technological change among a greater number, winch 
may perhaps be a more équitable solution than letting the cost fall 
on only a few. A positive feature of reducing hours, at least in the 
short-run, is that it does permit workers a minimum income during which 
time some can search for alternative employment. 
The limitations of a reduced work week for sharing employment 
will dépend on how flexible a plant's scheduling opérations are 18, and 
on the adaptability of its capital19. A company will not generally be 
indiffèrent between ten men working eight hours a day and sixteen men 
working five hours a day, even though the total daily manhours are eighty 
in each case. It simply may not be feasible for sixteen workers to be on the 
floor at one time ; and yet to divide up the tasks so that only ten men are 
on the floor but ail sixteen work at least some hours, could lead to 
complicated scheduling problems that may not satisfy either the workers 
or the company. Two alternatives are either to buy new machinery for 
the extra workers, or hâve extra shifts ; but both of thèse alternatives 
create extra production costs that will subsequently prompt management 
to accelerate the substitution of capital for labour. 
A reduced work week may be a fairly workable provision for 
providing workers with a minimum income during short periods caused by 
a fluctuating demand ; but for technological changes involving permanent 
17
 For exemple see : « Repercussions of a Réduction in Hours of Work », 
International Labour Review, Geneva, LXXXIV, July, 1956 p. 23 ; and Melvin 
REDER, « The Cost of a Shorter Work Week », I.R.R.A. Proceedings, 1956, p. 207. 
In the long run, reduced hours will only share employment if the elasticity of 
demand for labour is less than unity. If the elasticty of labour demand is greater 
than unity, then employment opportunities are destroyed. In both cases we assume 
that the weekly take home pay remains unchanged after the hourly change. 
18 See for instance, Allan CARTTER, «Discussion of the Economies of the 
Shorter Work Week », I.R.R.A. Proceeding, 1956, p. 224. 
19
 For a discussion of adaptability, see ; George STIGLER, «Production and 
Distribution in the Short Run », Journal of Political Economy, Chicago, Vol. 47, 
June, 1939, 305. 
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large displacements, its usefulness will always be severely limited, and 
in the case of a plant shut-down this technique is absolutely useless 20. 
JOINT COMMITTES 
A joint consultative committee is perhaps more a procédure or 
a means rather than an end in itself, but its merits are examined hère 
because of the widespread use of this approach21. Almost without 
exception, the case historiés of successful automation adjustments in 
Canada hâve included the rôle played by a joint committee22. 
However, the joint committee approach is only likely to be superior 
to traditional crisis collective bargaining if the proper attitude is attendant ; 
this attitude being that summed up by the assistance-for-loss criterion 
stressed throughout this paper. Given that workers should be compensated 
according to their income losses, the joint committee method is likely 
to develop a more effective program than the traditional collective bargain-
ing method because of several advantages. Thèse advantages are : joint 
committee délibération is more timely, so that the relevant conditions 
surrounding the technological change, including expected worker losses, 
are better known ; a joint committee is able to concentrate its attention 
on a single problem, and the almost total absence of an atmosphère of 
trading-off issues may further lead to the co-sponsorship of more objective, 
impartial, outside research ; and finally, in Canada, only a joint committee 
can take advantage of the substantial finances and research facilities 
provided by the Fédéral Government's Manpower Consultative Service. 
It should be stressed however, that a consultative joint committee 
is only effective when it is a vehicle for transmitting sincère management 
adjustment intentions. If this sincerity is not présent, then a joint com-
mittee likely only represents a conspicuous show played out for the bene-
fit of the workers and the public ; that is it is probably part of a highly 
visible public and employée relations program. Under thèse latter cir-
20
 The relative inefficiency of a reduce d hours provision is perhaps the reason 
why it is seldom employed by the private sector. Each of two surveys only found 
four agreements containing this type of provision, out of a total of 471 and 1,078 
agreements respectively for the two surveys ; Response to Technological Change, 
op. cit., appendix Table 4, and Technological Change Provisions in Ontario, op. 
cit., p. 67. 
21
 For example in our Fédéral study, there were as many agreements containing 
a joint committee provision (51) as there were containing advance notice, and 
thèse were the two provisions most frequently found ; Response to Technological 
Change, op. cit., appendix, Table 5. 
22
 For spécial emphasis see, COWAN, op. cit., p. 48. 
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cumstances adjustment might as well be relegated, with the other issues, 
to the regular collective bargaining period when bargaining power déter-
mines solutions, since it is very unusual for the union to hâve any power, 
other than managements good will, through the joint committee provision 
itself23. Because of this, in most cases if not ail, where joint committees 
hâve been successful, the parties hâve discussed not only the make-up of a 
joint committee during prior open period negotiations, but also the types 
of provisions that would be acceptable and available to make up an ef-
fective assistance package in light of the peculiar conditions at the time 
of the technological change. Without an overall prior understanding of the 
extent of the firm's commitment to assistance the consultative joint com-
mittee may not function well since it will be attempting to play « a trading-
off power rôle » more suited to regular negotiations. 
RETRAINING 
This subject is too involved for a short note hère, and this section 
contains only a brief listing of some of the possible trouble areas 
associated with private retraining provisions24. 
First, as with most private assistance provisions (the exception being 
advance notice) retraining will not likely apply in the event of a plant 
shut-down, since if the firm is bankrupt, the agreement and its provisions 
become dead. 
Second, if the technological change is an overall labour saving 
type that créâtes no, or not enough, new jobs for existing workers in a 
plant, where will the proposed trained workers go ? They will obviously 
hâve to go to other industries ; but then this raises the question of 
what interest union and management can expect to show in retraining 
workers that are leaving their employ and jurisdictions. The possibility is 
surely présent that training will be nominal and superficial, and hence 
ineffective as a means for providing assistance. On the other hand, if 
the workers are going to be retained by the firm, both it and the union 
will hâve a vested interest in the trained workers and training will likely 
be more substantial and relevant. 
23
 In our survey only five of the 51 committees had arbitration (4) or strike 
( 1 ) as the means for settling any différences ; Response to Technological Change, 
op. cit., appendix, Table 5. 
24 For a fuller discussion one may consult a paper the author read at the 
Third Annual Meeting of the Canadian Economies Association, Toronto, 1969 ; 
« Some Analytical Topics in the Economic Theory of Private Retraining, and Their 
Implications for Government Manpower Policy ». (Mimeoghaphed). 
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Third, when there are éléments of cost-sharing involved, or as is 
likely, when employées are selected for training on the basis of présent 
éducation and ability, the workers that are excluded are more likely than 
not to be those that are in the greatest need of assistance, such as the 
handicapped and uneducated poor. Hence, thèse workers may turn out 
to be neglected completely in the excitement of establishing a training 
program for the not so unfortunate ; but in any event, retraining is of 
no use in providing assistance to them. 
Finally, a good deal of retraining makes économie sensé, just as 
investment in physical capital and plant does25. However, retraining 
provides a pay-off that substantially spills over beyond the individual 
décision making firm to the worker and society in the form of increased 
productivity and incomes, and lower priées 26. But, in such circurnstances 
when social benefits significantly diverge from private benefits we cannot 
expect individual firms to provide training in optimum quantities.27. 
Hence, one can argue that training sponsorship should become a ward 
of the public sector. 
In sum, then, a good case can be made for transferring the sponsorship 
of a considérable amount, or ail, of retraining to governments. As 
illustrated, there are several reasons why private retraining schemes may 
not provide either the desired quantity or quality of retraining, and 
hence the effectiveness of retraining as an assistance technique may be 
seriously reduced if left in the hands of the private parties. 
Conclusion 
Whatever else private party assistance provisions may do, if they 
do not significantly solve the économie and conséquent social problems 
25
 There hâve been numerous studies attempting to measure the rate of return 
on retraining. Two useful surveys containing many of the results of thèse studies 
are : HARDIN « Benefit-Cost Analyses of Occupational Training Programs : A Com-
parison of Récent Studies», in SOMERS and WOOD (eds.), Cost-Benefit Analysis of 
Manpower Policies, Kingston, Queen's University Industrial Relations Centre, 1969, 
p. 97 ; and SOMERS (éd.) Retraining the Unemployed, Madison, University of Wis-
consin Press, 1968. 
26
 However, as Garry BECKER has demonstrated, firms will voluntarily under-
take to sponsor some training if it has a high job-specific content ; or in other 
words when there is not a significant divergence between social and private benefits. 
See his Human ^Capital, New York, National Bureau of Economie Research, 1964, 
chapter 2. 
27
 See for example, A. P. LERNER, The Economies of Control, New York, The 
Macmillan Company, 1949, chapter 2 ; or R. A. MUSGRAVE, The Theory of Public 
Finance, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1959, chapter 1. 
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associated with technological change and worker displacement, then some-
thing else will hâve to take their place. This paper has attempted to 
discuss how well the private sector provisions are likely to alleviate 
thèse problems ; and the conclusion is that if the private sector provisions 
are working effectively then it is largely due to luck and circumstance. 
First, this conclusion is reached because assistance is generally not 
systematically related to a worker's losses incurred through displacement 
or downgrading, while the economic and social problems are. Instead, 
assistance is generally systematically related to seniority (severance pay 
and lay-off procédures), which depending on circumstances may or may 
not be related to loss. 
Second, some provisions do not provide a net benefit but merely shift 
the displacement costs onto either older (early retirement), younger 
(seniority), or temporary (turnover storage) workers ; and, again, there 
is no a priori belief that thèse workers are systematically less harmed by 
displacement than others. 
Third, some provisions such as advance notice are just badly thought 
out so that no récognition is given to the fact that length of notice and 
its spécifie contents are related ; and, there are several instances where 
advance notice gives workers no meaningful notice or assistance at ail. 
Fourth, some provisions hâve been adopted that were plainly designed 
for other circumstances (reduced hours), and simply are ineffective for 
granting assistance when a permanent displacement of workers occurs. 
Fifth, some provisions (retraining) which may be effective in 
private hands will almost certainly be enhanced if taken over by the 
public sector. 
Finally, only under unusually mature and far-sighted private party 
relationships will any of thèse provisions be of value in the event of 
a plant shut-down ; yet plant shut-downs are clearly one of the most 
significant and visible contributors of the economic and social problems 
associated with technological change, and this is particularly so when 
the plant is located in a small town or village. 
In conclusion, it is suggested that the private sector could rectify 
most of their provisions' shorteomings by systematically granting assistance 
according to loss, rather than to other irrelevant criteria. However, there 
are, as argued above, several shorteomings that it is unlikely the private 
sector can overcome, and hence there may be a need for public législation 
in this increasingly important area of adjusting to technological change. 
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CHANGEMENTS TECHNOLOGIQUES ET 
TECHNIQUES DE LICENCIEMENTS 
Cet article vise à évaluer l'efficacité des moyens utilisés par les parties con-
tractantes dans le but d'atténuer les effets des changements technologiques pour les 
travailleurs. Et l'efficacité, il faut ici la considérer en fonction des pertes que les 
travailleurs licenciés peuvent encourir. 
La conclusion ne pourra être que la suivante : si les clauses relatives aux préavis, 
aux indemnités de licenciement, à l'usure des effectifs, à l'ancienneté, à la supplan-
tation, à la retraite anticipée, à la réduction de la semaine de travail, aux comités 
mixtes et au recyclage ont quelque valeur, c'est surtout l'effet du hasard ou d'un 
concours favorable de circonstances. 
On peut arriver à pareille conclusion d'abord parce que l'aide qu'on leur apporte 
est bien loin de toujours équivaloir aux pertes subies par les travailleurs touchés 
par le déplacement et la rétrogradation. Bien au contraire, elle se rattache presque 
toujours à l'ancienneté (indemnité de départ et modalités de la mise à pied) qui, au 
gré des circonstances, peuvent ou non avoir quelque équivalence avec la perte 
encourue. 
En second lieu, certaines clauses ne procurent aucun avantage tangible, mais 
se contentent de déplacer les coûts, soit sur les travailleurs âgés (retraite anticipée), 
soit sur les jeunes travailleurs (ancienneté), soit sur les ouvriers temporaires (réserve 
de main-d'oeuvre), et, au surplus, il n'y a pas le moindre indice que ces travailleurs 
soient moins lésés que d'autres par le licenciement. 
Troisièmement, des dispositions comme le préavis manquent souvent d'imagina-
tion au point de n'accorder aucun poids à la relation qui devrait exister entre la 
longueur du préavis et ses implications concrètes sur les travailleurs. Aussi, y a-t-il 
nombre de ces préavis qui ne sont d'aucune utilité pratique pour les travailleurs. 
Quatrièmement, les dispositions spéciales prévues pour des mises à pied de 
courte durée (la réduction des heures de travail) manquent totalement d'efficacité 
lorsqu'il se produit un licenciement permanent. 
Cinquièmement, des clauses (le recyclage) qui pourraient avoir de la valeur si 
elles étaient appliquées par les parties seront renforcées si elles passent au secteur 
public pour fin d'application. 
Enfin, ce n'est que s'il existe entre les parties un régime de relations bien rodé, 
tourné vers l'avenir, ce qui est inusité, que l'une quelconque de ces disposi-
tions pourra s'avérer de quelque valeur dans l'éventualité de la fermeture d'une usine. 
Et pourtant, les fermetures d'usines sont sûrement l'un des phénomènes importants 
et bien visibles d'où surgissent les problèmes sociaux et économiques reliés aux 
changements technologiques, et la chose est encore plus apparente quand l'usine 
est installée dans une petite ville ou un village. 
En guise de conclusion, qu'il suffise de suggérer au secteur privé de corriger 
les imperfections de ces dispositions de manière qu'elles puissent apporter une assis-
tance proportionnée à la perte encourue, au lieu de se référer à des critères hors 
de portée. Toutefois, il y a, tel qu'indiqué ci-dessus, plusieurs failles que le secteur 
privé est vraiment impuissant à surmonter et, à l'avenir, il faudra que la loi inter-
vienne pour imposer des solutions valables pour contrer les effets malencontreux des 
changements technologiques. 
